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In the pIeces to camera that George W. Bush has delivered since the terrorist attacks on the United 
States in September 2001 (9/11), the ideals of  “victory” and “freedom”, and more recently “success”, 
have driven the arguments for initiating, prolonging and sustaining belligerent action—jus ad bellum—
against a number of  different targets. Although it is quite acceptable to conclude in 2007 that the 
premise for the War in Iraq in 2003—based on the subsequently discredited argument that Saddam 
Hussein’s regime was in possession of  Weapons of  Mass Destruction (W.M.D.) capable of  delivery 
to London within an hour, and the supposed Iraqi links with terrorist organisation Al Qaeda—was 
deeply flawed, it is nevertheless important to further consider the processes by which that state of  war 
was invoked as an integral element of  the broader Global War on Terror (G.W.O.T.).
In the context of, as Victor Turner (1974) called it, the ‘social drama’ that was unfolding, this paper 
will consider the strategy of  invoking a “different type of  war” by looking at some of  the performative 
gestures, employed by George W. Bush in the role of  U.S. President, that have made up this assertion. 
The arguments by which the “different kind of  war” is conceptualised and justified have their basis 
upon the acts that are considered to have provoked the need for war, namely the acts of  September 
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11, 2001. This paper examines ways in which the performance of  “presidency”—particularly as the 
“war president”—has generated and maintained the performative conditions of  armed conflict, as 
well as ways in which those performative conditions have been interrupted and eroded over time.
One useful measure by which to gauge the effectiveness of  the Bush presidency is the “Presidential 
Approval Rating”. In this study the figures are derived from Gallup Poll surveys, which have peri-
odically been compared with similar surveys conducted by major media organisations and public 
opinion research centres in the United States. These figures are calculated from telephone survey 
responses to the question: “Do you approve or disapprove of  the way George W. Bush is handling 
his job as president?” Each survey is derived from a random sample of  at least 1000 U.S. adult resi-
dents. The table below is comprised of  Gallup Poll results from February 2001 to December 2006
 The three peaks—or ‘rally effects’—in the left half  of  the table’s “approval” line coincide with the 9/11 event, 
the start of  the War in Iraq in March 2003, and the capture of  Saddam Hussein in December 2003.
Bush’s job approval rating was around 51% on the 10th of  September 2001 (between then and the 
previous February it had fluctuated between 51% and 62%), by the 13th of  September it was some-
where between 86% and 91% according to various surveys (A.B.C., C.N.N. and Gallup, 13 Sept. 
2001), where it would hover until the end of  the year (PollingReport.com 2001). This leap in approval 
ratings is also referred to as the “rally-around-the-flag effect” (Mueller 1970, Baker and Oneal 2001). 
The Gallup Organization began measuring presidency approval ratings when Franklin D. Roosevelt 
was at the White House (1933-1945), and the levels of  approval that Bush rated—the ‘rally effect’—at 
this time were the highest that they had ever recorded (Newport et al 1997, Moore 2002).
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However, these characterisations do not present the entire picture, as many more instruments within 
this ensemble possess powerful determinations to remain, as with some commercial agents and 
interests, largely invisible (see Kirk 2003). In this case, the most “happy performatives” are not always 
the most visible ones. Nevertheless, the performance of  George W. Bush provides some insight into 
the nature of  this ensemble, the motivating factors involved, and the methodology that shapes this first 
major armed conflict of  the 21st century.
“A Different Kind of  War”
Just over 24 hours after the collapse of  the two World Trade Center towers in New York in 2001, Bush 
began to use the idea of  the “different” type of  conflict that was to come: 
[t]he American people need to know that we’re facing a different enemy than we have 
ever faced. This enemy hides in shadows, and has no regard for human life. This is an 
enemy who preys on innocent and unsuspecting people, then runs for cover. But it won’t 
be able to run for cover forever. This is an enemy that tries to hide. But it won’t be able 
to hide forever. This is an enemy that thinks its harbours are safe. But they won’t be safe 
forever  (Bush 2001a).
Over the next 18 days, on at least nine public appearances, Bush repeated that message, characterising 
the conflict and the enemy as one that could not have been anticipated by past conventions: 
 . . . this will be a different type of  war than we’re used to . . . this is a different type 
of  enemy than we’re used to. It’s an enemy that likes to hide and burrow in, and their 
network is extensive. There are no rules. It’s barbaric behavior . . . And we’re adjusting 
our thinking to the new type of  enemy (Bush 2001b; emphasis added).
This expressed requirement for a new set of  rules became a central component of  the G.W.O.T. 
and, along with the notion arising after the 9/11 event that the world had been changed, enabled the 
Bush Administration to claim that the status quo with regard to the conduct of  armed conflict was 
no longer relevant and that new standards of  conduct were needed. An integral component of  this
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In the Fall 2003 issue of  The Drama Review, Diana 
Taylor commented on the employment by Bush (in 
announcing the commencement of  full-scale mili-
tary actions against the Iraqi regime) of  “language 
that acts”, citing its usage in this instance as an ex-
ample of  a “happy” performative: that is, as being 
effective. It is also important to consider that the 
performativity of  George W. Bush is, by no means, 
the sole driver of  this “different” G.W.O.T., and to 
acknowledge the complex sets of  agency and inter-
est that converge upon this “opportunity”. In this 
sense, the “war president” is but one of  the many in-
struments by which the G.W.O.T. is legitimised and 
organised, albeit perhaps the most visible of  these 
instruments. This ensemble of  instruments is some-
times characterised as the “neo-conservative” ele-
ments within the U.S. leadership, and as the “coali-
tion of  the willing” within an international context. 
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Between October 2001 and February 2003, the case for the War in Iraq was developed by the Bush Administration. 
This justification comprised of  two central themes and four narrative threads that brought together the efforts of  a 
number of  intelligence agencies of  the “coalition of  the willing”. Some of  the key actors in this endeavour included 
Richard Cheney, Richard Perle, Karl Rove, John Rendon, George Tenet, Paul Wolfowitz, and Donald Rumsfeld.
claim was the assertion that a new sense of  normativity would now need to be negotiated. On the 25th 
of  October 2001, Richard Cheney addressed the Republican Governors Association in Washington 
and first spoke about “the new normalcy” emerging out of  “an understanding of  the world as it is” 
(Cheney 2001). 
There are two qualities in particular that came to characterise this “different” or “new” type of  war. 
First, it was thought of  as “asymmetric warfare” in that it would necessarily exploit:
. . . weaknesses using methods that differ significantly from the United States’ expected 
method of  operations [and] . . . generally seek a major psychological impact, such as 
shock or confusion that affects an opponent’s initiative, freedom of  action, or will [by 
employing] innovative, nontraditional tactics, weapons, or technologies (Joint Strategy 
Review 1999, cited in Metz and Johnson 2001). 
Secondly, it was made possible by the application of  “extrajudicial” powers in such areas as 
intelligence gathering programs, as well as in the detention and treatment of  “illegal combatants” 
(e.g. the suspension of  habeas corpus). These two qualities in combination came to be integral to the 
conduct of  the G.W.O.T.; these qualities would also become central to the process by which the “happy 
performative” of  Bush and his Administration would unravel. The establishment and subsequent
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disruption of  this happy performative can be seen to have rested upon the ability of  Bush to present 
a credible case for belligerent action, and his capacity to lead the United States towards the goals that 
he had posited in the first days of  the G.W.O.T. and the War in Iraq.
Performativity: The War President 
In the context of  performativity, these abilities came to be encapsulated in the role that Bush would 
claim towards the end of  his first term of  office—in his performance of  the role of  the “war president”.
I’m a war president. I make decisions here in the Oval Office in foreign-policy matters 
with war on my mind . . . I wish it wasn’t true, but it is true . . . the American people need 
to know they got a president who sees the world the way it is (Bush 2004).
Bush claimed this role in February 2004, just four months after the preliminary report on the existence 
(or otherwise) of  W.M.D. in Hussein’s Iraq by US inspector David Kay, and just two months after 
an escalation of  kidnappings and suicide bombings that indicated that Bush’s earlier claim, in May 
2003, that “major combat operations” in Iraq were over, was not substantiated (Bush 2003a). A month 
earlier, in January 2004, the first reports of  mistreatment of  Iraqi prisoners in the United States’ ad-
ministered facility at Abu Ghraib, outside Baghdad, came out from the International Committee of  
the Red Cross. These developments coincided with significant drops in the Bush presidential approval 
ratings in late 2003: the lowest points since early September 2001. The self-declaration of  the “war 
president” coincides with the lowest approval rating achieved by Bush in his entire presidency until 
that point. From this point, aside from a slight recovery in early February 2005 coinciding with the 
first National Assembly elections in Iraq, Bush’s approval rating went into a steady decline. The happy 
performative began to lose momentum.
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Nevertheless, the importance of  considering the strategies that have been, and continue to be, used by 
Bush in performing the role of  “war president” is not diminished. These strategies can be seen in the 
shifting vocabulary that comprises the language of  this war president. Bush has not uttered the word 
“crusade” in public since the 16th of  September 2001, the terminology applied has been more care-
fully chosen in the case for the War in Iraq. The notion of  a “different type of  war” enabled Bush to 
take a position that provided a high degree of  flexibility to the way that the war could be conducted, 
however much his executive powers may have been constrained by the expediency of  languages of  
politics and public diplomacy (see Silberstein 2002).
To begin with, the rationale for the military campaign was always kept in line with what was gener-
ally considered to be the acceptable justifications for belligerent action against another nation. The 
approach that Bush has taken in promoting the War in Iraq is generally in agreement with the ratings 
of  particular justifications listed below in a Gallup Poll survey from March 2003. The frequency of  
Bush’s use can be seen to match the levels of  public approval for each justification.
 
In spite of  numerous authoritative reports (e.g. Duelfer 2004) that seriously questioned the va-
lidity of  the W.M.D. imperative for war, Bush continues to reiterate the W.M.D. threat in quali-
fied forms: for example, that Saddam Hussein may not have possessed any W.M.D. in 2003 but 
the regime had the intention of  acquiring them. The conflation of  the W.M.D. theme with the 
imperative of  “victory” has been a recurring part of  the strategy adopted by Bush in attempting 
to maintain the perception of jus ad bellum. Furthermore, this conflation is repeatedly magnified 
by the affective impact of  the 9/11 event, a theme that nearly always finds a mention in Bush’s
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set pieces, in proximity to any mention of  the War in Iraq—although no explicit connection would 
necessarily be overtly argued in the passages. Woven into this, the regard of  “history” is also repeat-
edly invoked to heighten the sense of  the “stakes” involved. This is particularly the case where Bush 
has addressed an active military audience: two examples from 2006 illustrate the use of  these themes. 
The first is from an address delivered on a visit to troops in Baghdad in mid-June:
[t]hese are historic times. The mission that you’re accomplishing here in Iraq will go 
down in the history books as an incredibly important moment in the history of  freedom 
and peace; an incredibly important moment of  doing our duty to secure our homeland. 
You know, right after September the 11th I knew that some would forget the dangers we 
face. Some would hope that the world would be what it’s not—a peaceful place in which 
people wouldn’t want to do harm to those of  us who love freedom. I vowed that day, after 
September the 11th, to do everything I could to protect the American people. And I was 
able to make that claim because I knew there were people such as yourself  who were will-
ing to be on the front line in the war on terror (Bush, 2006a) 
The second, three weeks later, in a speech commemorating Independence Day, was delivered to a 
military audience at Fort Bragg, North Carolina: 
[v]ictory in Iraq will not, in itself, end the war on terror. We’re engaged in a global struggle 
against the followers of  a murderous ideology that despises freedom and crushes all dis-
sent, and has territorial ambitions and pursues totalitarian aims. This enemy attacked 
us in our homeland on September the 11th, 2001. They’re pursuing weapons of  mass 
destruction that would allow them to deliver even more catastrophic destruction to our 
country and our friends and allies across the world. They’re dangerous. And against such 
enemy there is only one effective response: We will never back down, we will never give in 
and we will never accept anything less than complete victory . . . These are historic times 
. . . (Bush 2006a).
The repeated use of  these themes is a critical element in the process on maintaining the perception of  
a “justified” war, and thus can be seen as a key element of  the performativity of  the “war president” 
(see Landau 2004). In addition, another motivational element underlying these themes was intially 
articulated by Bush soon after the 9/11 event:
. . . through the tears of  sadness I see an opportunity. Make no mistake about it, this na-
tion is sad. But we’re also tough and resolute. And now is an opportunity to do genera-
tions a favor, by coming together and whipping terrorism; hunting it down, finding it and 
holding them accountable. The nation must understand, this is now the focus of  my ad-
ministration. . . . now that war has been declared on us, we will lead the world to victory, 
to victory. (Bush 2001a)
Bush uses the rhetoric of  “opportunity” as a contrast to the “threat” that has been faced—the threat
posited by Bush as the rallying point for the War in Iraq, for example:
America must not ignore the threat gathering against us. Facing clear evidence of  peril, 
we cannot wait for the final proof—the smoking gun—that could come in the form of  a 
mushroom cloud (Bush, 2002).
The “opportunity” serves as a rallying point for the G.W.O.T. and a call to action, to those predis-
posed to taking decisive action in crisis situations, and perhaps to profiting through them. Unfortu-
nately, the rhetoric of  opportunity can easily tip over into a type of  bravado that has the potential
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to undermine efforts in the longer term, as in Bush’s response to the first signs of  an Iraqi “insurgen-
cy” in the immediate period following the declaration of  “mission accomplished” in May 2003:
[there] are some who feel like . . . that the conditions are such that they can attack us there. 
My answer is, bring them on. We’ve got the force necessary to deal with the security situ-
ation (Bush 2003b).
.  
In combination, these themes and elements formed the justification for war: the happy performative 
of  the war president, for as long as it held together. As apparent in the presidential approval ratings 
table, the unravelling of  that justification came about from a series of  events that brought into ques-
tion the validity of  the case for war: the deterioration of  the aura of  credibility of  the war president. 
This deterioration began in earnest after the “mission accomplished” speech, when the mechanism 
for the construction of  the case for war became visible and when the Bush Administration’s reactions 
to those who were prepared to reveal this mechanism became apparent.
This process was accelerated when Joseph Wilson wrote an Op-Ed piece titled “What I Didn’t Find 
in Africa”, published in the New York Times on 6 July 2003, setting off  a train of  events that exposed 
the mechanics of  the “Niger uranium” thread of  the case for war. One by one, the mechanics of  the 
other threads of  the justification would also be revealed and questioned. The “Prague and 9/11” 
narrative, asserting that one of  the leaders of  the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Mohammed Atta, had met an 
Iraqi intelligence officer in Prague in 2001, had never quite developed into a credible claim. Although 
Cheney had reiterated this assertion on numerous occasions prior to 2003, it could not stand on its 
own and was eventually dismissed by the 9/11 Commission Report (Kean 2005, 228-229; 522-523). 
The “aluminum tubes” narrative first came to public attention in early September 2002 (Miller and 
Gordon 2002); but by January 2003 the International Atomic Energy Agency (I.A.E.A.) had raised se-
rious doubts on the credibility of  the claims being made by the Bush Administration in relation to the 
tubes (ElBaradei 2003) and by October 2003 the Iraq Survey Group had dismissed the claim that the 
tubes contributed to a nuclear armaments program (Kay 2003). The “defectors and labs” narrative,
developed for the C.I.A. and Pentagon by the Rendon Group (an international strategic communica-
tions consultancy firm contracted to produce a public relations campaign in preparation for the war) 
through the Iraqi National Congress (I.N.C.), first emerged in public discourse in December 2001
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(Cave 2001; Miller 2001); by May 2003, the roles of  the I.N.C. and the Rendon Group in developing 
the defector source for the “mobile laboratories” had been exposed (Kurtz 2003, Hosking 2003). 
Through 2005, the unravelling of  the happy performative gathered momentum through the rise of  
a popular movement against the War in Iraq, aided by the very public grief  and profile of  activists 
such as Cindy Sheehan, and the demise of  Cheney’s advisor Scooter Libby resulting from the Wilson/
Plame scandal (in which the wife of  Joseph Wilson, Valerie Plame, was exposed by senior White 
House officials as an active C.I.A. field agent, in apparent retaliation for Wilson’s refutation of  the Ni-
ger uranium story). Then with Hurricane Katrina and the subsequent chaos in New Orleans, Bush’s 
approval rating fell to 38%, the lowest of  his presidency. Worse was still to come. In early 2006, an epi-
sode that came to be known as the “Revolt of  the Generals” unfolded as six to nine retired generals of  
the U.S. military went on public record as highly critical of  Donald Rumsfeld’s capacity as Secretary 
of  Defence, giving voice to a crisis of  confidence within the active-duty military corps and the U.S. 
public-at-large (Duffy 2006; Whalen 2006). By May, Bush’s approval rating fell to 31%.
 
Aside from the presidential approval ratings, another way of  tracking the performance record of  
George W. Bush as President can be his appearances on the covers of  major publications, in this case 
on the cover of  Time magazine. Between June 1999 and December 2004, Bush appeared on the cover 
of  Time on twenty ocassions; twice as that magazine’s “Person of  the Year”, in 2000 and 2004. In the 
27 December 2004 issue, the magazine proudly declared Bush to be an “American Revolutionary”. 
Then something changed: he did not appear on another Time cover until the 27 February 2006 issue, 
reduced to a blur whilst the focus was now on his Vice President, Cheney, as the decisive figure of  
power (see below, p. 10).
In his 1999 autobiography, Bush discussed his belief  in the ways that certain events or episodes can 
shape one’s perceptions of  self, others and the environment, of  what is deemed to be ‘real’:
Most lives have defining moments. Moments that forever change you. Moments that set
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you on a different course. Moments of  recognition so vivid and so clear that everything 
later seems different (Bush and Hughes 1999, 1). 
Throughout Bush’s political career we see his propensity for being led by the “definitions” that he 
would adopt and place upon his roles and situations: for his performativity to be animated by a shift-
ing set of  labels that would be repeatedly invoked to maintain his chosen performative approach with 
cyclic tenacity. These definitions come to function as the performative object that he presents to in-
tended audiences—to his constituency and to the regard of  history. What can also be seen throughout 
Bush’s presidency are a number of  rallying points that he posited at each stage of  his time in office. 
In 2000 he was elected on a call to “compassionate conservatism” (Bush 2000); after 9/11 he called 
for a rally around the G.W.O.T.; in 2003 it was the War in Iraq, which later became the “victory” 
in Iraq, and then “success” by way of  a “new” strategy—“the way forward”—that came be known 
as “the surge”. On his 22nd appearance on the cover of  Time (6 Nov 2006) in his 71st month in the 
Office of  the President of  the United States, he would receive a new label: “The Lone Ranger”. The 
cover caption was far more circumspect than the tone of  the December 2004 cover: “He’s faltering 
in Iraq. He’s out of  favor with his own party. He’s increasingly isolated.” The accompanying image 
shows Bush, literally, leaving the picture—exit stage left. Bush would have done well to note a tragic 
tendency of  popular historical memory: powerful leaders, and certainly U.S. presidents, are ultimately 
remembered for the wars they waged and the scandals in which they became mired.
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